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 Political influence in American policymaking has been a longstanding theme in 15 
urban politics. For years, Lasswell’s original query about “who gets what, when and 16 
how?” (1936) has inspired generations of scholars in interest group theory, community 17 
power, intergovernmental relations, and public organization theory. The research 18 
response has left political scientists well stocked with answers to the query, but the 19 
results remain incomplete from a larger social science perspective. Aimed at discovering 20 
the influence of actors engaged in the political process, most urban policy research 21 
(except a few like Dahl, 1961) generally overlook the indirect influence of anonymous 22 
social genre. The question raised by this book, then, may not be “does class matter?” but 23 
“in what form does it matter?” 24 
 Typically, we assume symbolic “actors” or identities are not of organized groups, 25 
and hence lack specific interest and direct political force necessary to sway public 26 
policymaking. The result is that such influence on policy outcomes is not usually 27 
considered. The oversight may be especially symptomatic in the study of social class. 28 
This chapter examines a little acknowledged thesis about an upper middle class (UMC) 29 
genre skewing a public agency’s outcomes in ways that favor some interests at the 30 
expense of others. The thesis argues that policy outcomes are indirectly influenced by the 31 
“systemic power” (Stone, 1980) of an UMC genre apart from the influence of political 32 
activities of UMC persons. 33 
 Given the qualitative nature of this relationship, the research offers a modest 34 
empirical test which links multivariate analysis with inferential reasoning. This includes 35 
developing (1) a multiple perspectives framework of policy outcomes (the dependent 36 
variables), (2) a demographic profile of the UMC (the independent variable), and three 37 
hypotheses linking the UMC with policy outcomes. Hypotheses are tested using controls 38 
for rival theses in a regression analysis of a nationwide sample of urban transit agencies. 39 
 40 
Policy Outcomes From Multiple Perspectives 41 
 42 
 Before we propose connections between an UMC and policymaking, we first must 43 
ask about the meaning of “policy outcomes.” In a plural society, institutional theory 44 
envisions the public agency "as a going concern, taking account of relevant stakeholders, 45 
attending to long-run interests, being sensitive to the operative structure of authority" 46 
(Selznick, 1996, p. 272). Analyzing the agency's policy outcomes therefore involves a 47 
multiple-perspectives approach. However, with differences in perspective come 48 
disagreements over the benefits of outcomes, making this approach even more essential 1 
to policy analysis when "political actors. . .have significantly different expectations about 2 
bureaucratic performance" (Gruber, 1987, p. 142).  3 
 Since a determination of "goodness" in agency results varies according to the 4 
interests of different stakeholders, the study measures policy results from a comparative 5 
perspective involving both administration-centered  and external political-centered 6 
outcomes (Boschken, 1994, 1992; Bozeman, 1988). The analytical structure imparts an 7 
ability to compare policymakers' priorities in choosing who gets what (Levy, Meltsner 8 
and Wildavsky, 1974), and reveals patterns of policy outcomes skewed to favor some 9 
stakeholders more than others. The framework therefore differs from single-norm 10 
analysis found in most studies of efficiency (e.g., Downs and Larkey, 1986), 11 
effectiveness (e.g., Chubb and Moe, 1990), and innovation (e.g., Clark, 1994).   12 
 The framework's analytical focus is on outcome skewness and consists of indices 13 
(the dependent variables) representing different types of agency performance.  A 14 
condition of skewness exists when an agency exhibits outcome emphases and de-15 
emphases which combined form an asymmetrical pattern of performance. The key 16 
assumption is that with limited resources, an agency will not and cannot emphasize all 17 
legitimate outcomes.  For example, when caught in a paradox, one agency might skew 18 
outcomes to favor bureaucratic efficiency, while another skews outcomes to emphasize 19 
social program effectiveness. 20 
 Possible skewed patterns in this comparative framework are composed empirically 21 
of three types of agency outcomes, each fostered by different stakeholder perspectives.  22 
The first and second types -- labeled outcomes of strategic organizational effectiveness 23 
and outcomes of operational efficiency -- are preferred by the agency's administrative 24 
constituencies located at different levels within the agency.  The third perspective -- 25 
labeled outcomes of social-program effectiveness -- is the principal interest of non-26 
market "user" constituencies. 27 
 The first of these, strategic organizational effectiveness, is most often associated 28 
with a senior management focused on the vitality of the organization as-a-whole. With its 29 
substantial professional stake in agency prominence, this constituency promotes its 30 
economic status and overall budgetary growth (Niskanen, 1971). Moreover, senior 31 
management is charged "with identifying new strategies and new projects that will add to 32 
the organization's overall strength" (Doig and Mitchell, 1992, p. 21). Measures of this 33 
outcome fit a standard of organizational effectiveness because they show "the ability of 34 
an organization to exploit its environment to obtain resources, while maintaining an 35 
autonomous bargaining position" (Mindlin and Aldrich, 1975, p. 382). 36 
 The second outcome category is operational efficiency, which is the domain of 37 
management charged with controlling resources in daily matters.  Operational outcomes 38 
are about "efficient ways of bringing services to the public" (Doig and Mitchell, 1992, p. 39 
21), and represent goodness in terms of minimizing cost-per-unit by "adherence to 40 
engineering standards, accounting rules..." (Doig and Mitchell, 1992, p. 25). Included in 41 
this are the costs of administration, service delivery, and facilities maintenance and 42 
replacement. 43 
 Both administration-centered outcomes differ from one another in managerial 44 
function and motivation, and both are contrasted with the third outcome category of 45 
social-program effectiveness. Bozeman's distinctions between "economic" and "political" 46 
sources of agency legitimacy (1988) offer a way to contrast this third outcome. From an 1 
extra-market perspective, social programs provide results that seldom would arise from 2 
market transactions. Natural market demand fails to result because either (1) those who 3 
want such outcomes do not have the means to pay, or (2) the costs and benefits of such 4 
service outcomes cannot be meaningfully related to each other by a market transaction. 5 
 Since not all political demands are legitimate and worthy of governmental 6 
response, criteria for social-program effectiveness usually are determined by legislative 7 
mandates and interagency agreements. Examples of legitimated public demands range 8 
from transit services provided to the handicapped under the Americans for Disabilities 9 
Act to broader programs promoting economic development and mobility for the urban 10 
poor. 11 
 By threading together the above three policy-outcome categories (henceforth called 12 
Outcome I, II and III, respectively) into a multiple-perspectives framework, we make 13 
possible a comparison of government policymaking according to different patterns of 14 
outcome emphasis and de-emphasis. This forms the basis on which to ask why such 15 
variance in skewed patterns occurs across localities. 16 
 17 
The Upper Middle Class Thesis 18 
  19 
UMC influence on politics has drawn a large social science following even though many 20 
disagree over the existence and meaning of "class" in America.  To contemporary 21 
policymakers and scholars studying an UMC, this class genre exhibits certain central 22 
tendencies that are distinct albeit empirically elusive. Robert Reich, for example, 23 
summarizes the UMC as "the glass-tower people" -- those institutionally influential types 24 
who are economically ascendant, college educated and professionally employed (in 25 
Farney, 1994, p. 1). Stone (1980) theorizes about a similarly-defined "upper stratum" that 26 
holds an indirect and impersonal influence on policymakers through systemic power. 27 
Clark (1994a) benchmarks a compatible profile (but adds age) which aspires to a "New 28 
Political Culture." Brint (1994) outlines activities of a "matrix" of "educated 29 
professionals" defined by their "employment situation." 30 
 Over the last century, writings have reinforced a continuity in these contemporary 31 
visions of an upper middle class. With regard to high and rising income, Riesman saw 32 
fiscal resources taking on icreased social meaning as society moved away from a 33 
“scarcity psychology” toward an “abundance psychology” (1961, p. 19; 1964). Maslow 34 
(1954) predicted that as basic wants are met, surplus resources free individuals to “self-35 
actualize” and pursue symbolic goals. Veblen (1948) saw as far back as the 1920s a 36 
“leisure class” engaging in “conspicuous consumption.” 37 
 A college educated UMC is seen as equally persistent, especially after WWII. As 38 
the repository of institutionalism, the contemporary university setting provides a 39 
particular instruction that prepares a person simultaneously in functional expertise and 40 
institutional protocol (Waldo, 1948; Kerr, 1963; Scott and Hart, 1979). Nourished by this 41 
conceptual knowledge of institutions and science, the UMC acquire a common language, 42 
set of referent symbols, code of conduct, and awareness of institutional processes not 43 
shared for the most part by non-UMC. 44 
 As Professionals, the UMC are characterized as society’s “general staff” (Veblen, 45 
1948, p. 440), whose principal role is to apply their education to continuously inventing 46 
new appliances and to managing organizational resources (Whyte, 1958; Pfeffer and 1 
Salancik, 1979; Brint, 1994). To accomplish these roles, they are granted titles, positions 2 
and other symbols of distinction suitable for those in charge of organizational methods 3 
and technologies (Veblen, 1948; Whyte, 1958; Teisman, 1961, Scott and Hart, 1979). 4 
 This socioeconomic profile is seen connected to the intensity with which the UMC 5 
(1) exhibit "other-directedness" (Riesman, 1961) toward each other rather than emulating 6 
other social groupings, and (2) seek "associational position" (Stone, 1980) by belonging 7 
to an organized influential social genre (Ashforth and Mael, 1989). Why should such 8 
membership matter?  Riesman says without aristocratic ancestry or a psychological 9 
"gyroscope" to establish influential position, behavior protocol or community connection, 10 
UMC persons must acquire status and approval through continuous "responsive contact" 11 
with each other (1961, p. 23). All people seek social group identity, but the UMC is set 12 
apart by a preoccupation with "the process of striving itself..." (p. 21).   13 
 Why, then, is a UMC genre not more distinct empirically?  Partly, it may be that 14 
striving to appear influential does not require verbal contact. Social psychology research 15 
shows that individuals "interact" with others in a similar social position even when they 16 
have no direct communications (Lazer, 1995; Burt, 1987). Using non-verbal cues, the 17 
formation of anonymous groupings is based on the exhibition of structural equivalence in 18 
socioeconomic status (SES). 19 
 The term defines "a measure of an individual's status, where individuals are 20 
sensitive to what other individuals of similar status are doing, believing, etc." (Lazer, 21 
1995, p. 4).  This involves prior consensus on "prototypical characteristics abstracted 22 
from the grouping" (Turner, 1985).  The UMC's economic ascendancy, university 23 
education and professional status are convenient for determining structural equivalence 24 
because they are openly displayed without reliance on verbal communications. These 25 
symbols of institutional achievement demonstrate equivalence in influential position 26 
rather than material "look-a-likes."  27 
 For the most part, the writings talk about these SES characteristics as interlaced 28 
dimensions of a core profile which empirically distinguish a UMC from non-UMC (e.g., 29 
Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). At various times, other attributes have been 30 
prominent as well, including religion (i.e., WASP), mobility, consumption patterns, age 31 
and ethnicity. But, their lack of empirical salience over time in defining structural 32 
equivalence makes them peripheral to the core profile defined here. 33 
 What then, is the connection of a UMC genre to policy outcomes? Stone (1980) 34 
theorizes that the UMC exercises an indirect influence that "is completely impersonal and 35 
deeply embedded in the social structure." (p. 981).  The mere presence of the UMC genre 36 
in a "diamond-shaped distribution" (p. 983) of socioeconomic status may be sufficient as 37 
a systemic power to affect policy outcomes.  Therefore, the proportion of UMC in an 38 
agency's service population should approximate the visibility of the UMC's non-verbal 39 
display of influential position. The following hypotheses associate this proportion with 40 
emphases in the three different policy outcomes: 41 
 42 
Strategic Organizational Effectiveness (Outcome I) 43 
 44 
 Why the UMC genre promotes emphasis on organizational vitality in public 45 
agencies involves a two-step logic. First, UMC motives are defined by organizational 46 
values which promote administrative processes as a way-of-life (Whyte, 1958). As "a 1 
vast complex of interlocking management systems, sharing a common set of values" 2 
(Scott and Hart, 1979, p. 5), organizations offer "a distinctive employment situation for 3 
the majority of professionals" (Brint, 1994, p.12) and provide an arena-in-common for 4 
expressing "associational position" (Stone, 1980, p. 982) and measuring structural 5 
equivalence.   6 
 Second, public organizations in this "interlocking" allocation system represent an 7 
extension of the field of business (Wilson, 1941), and play an instrumental role in a UMC 8 
lifestyle.  "Free markets thrive, not in splendid isolation, but in a context of large and 9 
productive business and government organizations," the latter which provides 10 
"effectiveness of infrastructure and public goods" (Simon, 1995, p. 404). Although 11 
clouded by current anti-government sentiment of the median voter, to be against healthy 12 
public organizations is inconsistent with the faith and investment the UMC has made in 13 
the trappings of organizational culture: higher education, administrative protocol and 14 
professional competence.  15 
 Hence, we deduce from these arguments: 16 
 17 
H1: The greater the proportion of UMC in an agency’s 18 
service area population, the greater the emphasis an 19 
agency will place on performance stressing strategic 20 
organizational effectiveness. 21 
 22 
Operational Efficiency (Outcome II) 23 
 24 
 The UMC is painted as having subordinate concern for efficiency by virtue of the 25 
group's achieved material security and fiscal abundance. While seemingly counter to 26 
happenings in the Progressive Era, this pre-WWII period is characterized by Reisman's 27 
"scarcity psychology" (1961) where a professional UMC had not yet replaced the robber 28 
barons and other nouveau riches as influentials in American institutions. With the 29 
spreading of affluence after WWII, Riesman characterizes UMC ambience as driven by 30 
an "abundance psychology" where respect for the proficiency of work is subdued by a 31 
"cult of effortlessness." Other works as well sketch a psychology involving a worthiness 32 
in sacrificing efficiency for "higher order" symbolics. These include Clark and Goetz's 33 
NPC influence on urban growth (1994); Brint's post WWII rise of the "educated 34 
professional" (1994); Maslow's hierarchical pursuit of "self-actualization" (1954); and 35 
Veblen's "conspicuous waste" by a "leisure class" (1948). 36 
 Hence, we deduce from this: 37 
 38 
H2: The greater the proportion of UMC in an agency’s 39 
service area population, the more likely the agency 40 
will deemphasize operations efficiency in favor of 41 
strategic (higher order) outcomes. 42 
 43 
Social-Program Effectiveness (Outcome III) 44 
  45 
Social program effectiveness raises a perplexing question. Why should welfare programs 46 
matter to the UMC except from fiscal and employment standpoints?  With few 47 
exceptions, the UMC is seldom very cognizant of its "use" of or dependence on most 1 
specific services like transit. Although traditional class theory might argue the UMC are 2 
"social trustees" (Brint, 1994) who accept "noblesse oblige," a more plausible answer is 3 
that the UMC's urban habitat serves as another non-verbal means to calculate the 4 
structural equivalence of social position in interurban comparisons. Hammond, for 5 
example, points to the UMC's metropolis as a "nonverbal medium for the communication 6 
of moral reputation, social rank, and other significant qualities of self" (1992, p. 258). 7 
 Due to this, the UMC becomes more concerned about the overall quality and 8 
character of the urban area which taxes support (Clark, 1994, p. 27). Urban planning 9 
research shows symbolic considerations including public accouterments (prominent 10 
airport, arts and entertainment, reputable schools, modern mass transit) are more 11 
important than economic issues in UMC voting (Hahn and Kamieniecki 1987). 12 
Gottdiener supports this connection, saying that "the urban image must be read...as an 13 
outcome of a class society propelled by powerful forces of development and change" 14 
(1986, p. 216). Social programs that address UMC quality of life matter because living in 15 
a formidable "world class" urban area adds stature in the quest for positional influence 16 
and structural equivalence. 17 
 Hence, we deduce from this logic: 18 
 19 
H3: The greater the proportion of UMC in an agency’s service 20 
population, the more likely the agency will emphasize 21 
social-program effectiveness. 22 
 23 
 The three hypotheses compose a thesis that UMC influence occurring as an 24 
anonymous agent causes a skewed or asymmetrical pattern of outcomes consisting of 25 
emphases on strategic organizational effectiveness (Outcome I) and social-program 26 
effectiveness (Outcome III), and a deemphasis on operational efficiency (Outcome II).   27 
 28 
Rival Theses 29 
 30 
 Implying that class does not matter, research on urban policy outcomes seldom 31 
includes a UMC genre as an independent determinant (e.g., Pagano and Bowman, 1995; 32 
Feiock and West, 1993). If represented at all, the UMC is treated either (1) as issue-33 
defined political actors directly involved (e.g. political entrepreneurs, interest groups), or 34 
(2) as demographic variables randomized with others describing the agency's surrounding 35 
social and physical environment.  Hence, a central question is: does the UMC genre 36 
operate independently of variables used in past research?  To examine the UMC thesis in 37 
this context, four rival theses are incorporated in the model. 38 
  The most central is the "political actor” thesis, which targets the direct influence of 39 
high-status individuals and interest groups (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995;  Clark 40 
and Ferguson, 1983; Lowi, 1969), community conflict and power structure (Stone, 1989; 41 
Peterson, 1981), political competition and entrepreneurship of elected officials (Clark and 42 
Goetz, 1994; Doig and Hargrove, 1987; Feiock and Clingermayer, 1986), and 43 
intergovernmental exchange (Boschken, 1997; Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997; Agranoff and 44 
McGuire, 1993). 45 
 While predicted outcomes vary by type of actor investigated, the common 46 
denominator for all is direct use of political power as the causal agent of policy outcomes.  47 
For example, when the locus of power lies outside the agency (i.e., in Mayors, dominant 1 
community group, or interagency network), the agency will be less likely to emphasize 2 
its bureaucratic prominence (Outcome I). The thesis is a central rival because it argues 3 
that since UMC persons are politically more active than others (Verba, Schlozman and 4 
Brady, 1995), UMC influence is most likely to be from individuals and not an 5 
anonymous source. 6 
 Other rival theses speak of urban structure determinants describing physical form 7 
and general social makeup of a city as preconditions in policymaking. Although not 8 
involving identifiable actors, urban structure presents agencies with "non-negotiable" 9 
opportunities and limitations on policymaking. What these preconditions predict as 10 
policy outcomes, however, varies by rival thesis. 11 
 One is the "underclass” thesis (Clark, 1994a; Lineberry, 1977) which argues policy 12 
outcomes are distributed according to class distinctions typically measured by race or 13 
ethnicity. Describing a "double standard," the thesis assumes a zero-sum allocation where 14 
"them that has, gets" (Lineberry, 1977, p. 61). For government, this is likely to result in 15 
white preferences for lower taxes and reduced spending on programs that benefit the 16 
city's underclass. Focused on the powerlessness of lower classes, the thesis 17 
operationalizes the underclass determinant as a politically-passive precondition of 18 
poverty demographics.   19 
 A second urban structure rival is the "resource-availability” thesis which has two 20 
components - native wealth of the urban area and intergovernmental funding 21 
opportunities (Dye, 1992, pp. 315-316; Schneider, 1989; Clark and Ferguson, 1983). The 22 
thesis holds that public agencies spend money to emphasize Outcomes I and III according 23 
to the level of economic resources made available from local tax receipts or 24 
intergovernmental sources. 25 
 The third structural rival is the "urban spatial form” thesis (Cervero, 1991; Timms, 26 
1971; Burgess and Bogue, 1967). It argues that physical configuration of urban activities 27 
determines the level and proficiency of public expenditures. Contrasting configurations 28 
range along a scale between a monocentric pattern of urban activity (center-peripheral) to 29 
a polycentric (sprawl) pattern. The thesis holds that a monocentric pattern facilitates 30 
emphases on organizational effectiveness (Outcome I) and operational efficiencies 31 
(Outcome II) because high densities allow an agency to achieve deeper market 32 
penetration, more concentrated use, and economies of scale.  33 
 34 
Methodology 35 
  36 
The research was designed to test the hypotheses with data from standard nationwide 37 
reporting systems. It employed a cross-sectional sample of 42 urban transit agencies 38 
operating transit systems in larger metropolitan areas (i.e., with at least 500,000 39 
population). They were identified from the FTA's directory of transit agencies (UMTA, 40 
1988). These agencies were selected because most are statutory public enterprises which 41 
pursue multiple policy outcomes and because transit is a visible infrastructure component 42 
of the urban environment. Data are specific to each transit agency and the population 43 
within its jurisdiction, and are from the U.S. Census and the annual Section 15 reporting 44 
system compiled by USDOT's Federal Transportation Administration (FTA). Section 15 45 
reporting is mandated for federal funding and contains uniform self-reported data on 1 
agency finances, costs and service levels.   2 
 As components of outcome skewness, three continuum-scaled dependent variables 3 
operationalize the agency performances contained in the policy outcomes framework. 4 
Each variable is an indice consisting of multiple measures commonly used in transit and 5 
is calculated from FTA data (see note to Table 1 for detail).  Since any one year is subject 6 
to unrepresentative distortions, five years of data (1987-1991) were averaged for 7 
individual measures. This procedure, however, does not eliminate the possibility that the 8 
averages are atypical of longer time frames. 9 
 Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations of the three outcome indices are 10 
provided in Table 1. The indices have significant associations, indicating the skewness 11 
pattern is composed of interrelated components. The two inversely (negative) related 12 
associations represent tradeoffs by the industry as-a-whole in emphasizing different 13 
performance outcomes. The most significant tradeoff is between strategic organizational 14 
effectiveness and operations efficiency (r = -.56). While an agency could try to 15 
emphasize strategic organizational effectiveness (Outcome I) by striving to be efficient 16 
(Outcome II), the correlations show a tradeoff as the industry-wide rule. The other 17 
tradeoff is between social program effectiveness and operations efficiency (r = -.38). 18 
Together, they give basis to asking whether the UMC genre matters in explaining this 19 
pattern. 20 
___________________________ 21 
 22 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 23 
___________________________ 24 
  25 
As the independent variable, the UMC genre is operationalized by a factor consisting of 26 
four discriminant SES components. Choice of a factor fits the thesis that policy outcomes 27 
are influenced by the whole UMC profile and not individual components. It is supported 28 
statistically by a principal components analysis which determined a single factor 29 
(eigenvalue of 3.14, accounting for 80 percent of the four-component variance). The four 30 
components were operationalized using 1990 Census data corresponding to agency 31 
jurisdictions. The components are (1) High Income (percent of households with 1989 32 
income above $75,000 -- a figure more than twice the national mean), (2) Income Change 33 
(percent change in household income 1989 over 1979, which captures upward economic 34 
mobility), (3) College Education (percent of individuals with four or more years of higher 35 
education), and (4) Professional Status (percentage of individuals having careers in 36 
professional or managerial positions).   37 
 Control variables were included in regressions to represent rival theses.  For the 38 
political actor thesis, past research includes numerous variables. As an alternative to 39 
arbitrary selection among actor-specific variables, a surrogate strategy was chosen which 40 
held the potential for estimating direct power for most types of political actors. However, 41 
the imprecise nature of surrogates may lead to underestimates of political power relative 42 
to the more specific UMC factor. To reduce the potential effect of random measurement 43 
error in assessing the political actor thesis, the strategy called for two surrogate forms.   44 
 In the first, agencies were assumed to be influenced by powerful political 45 
entrepreneurs when operating in a partisan arena of limited competition. Pressman (1972) 46 
characterized prerequisites of mayoral power that include strong one-party dominance. 1 
Feiock and Clingermayer (1986) found that strong political entrepreneurs emerge when 2 
elections persistently reflect a dominant party. Consistent with this research, the political 3 
actor thesis is represented in part by a variable called party dominance. 4 
 It is measured by a three-point scale dummied from 1988 and 1992 presidential 5 
election results. The scale was determined by whether a party won both elections and by 6 
how much. For example, a condition of dominance required that a party win both 7 
elections by more than 55 percent. The variable is not a perfect surrogate because 8 
although political entrepreneurs seldom emerge as strong political actors when inter-party 9 
competition is high, the dominance of one party enables but does not assure the 10 
emergence of strong entrepreneurs (Grimshaw, 1996). Hence, the dummy variable should 11 
be read as less likely/more likely to involve a powerful political entrepreneur. 12 
 For the second form, most uses of political power were assumed to be channeled 13 
through an intergovernmental (IG) process (Boschken, 1997; Agrnoff and McGuire, 14 
1993; Schneider, 1989). "In the public realm, federalism and  separation of powers imply 15 
a plurality of targets for political activity" (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995, p. 7), 16 
where politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups interact to couple their individual 17 
preferences with focal-agency policy making. Hence, the thesis is represented by IG 18 
surrogates measuring a focal agency's fiscal and statutory autonomy in an 19 
intergovernmental arena.   20 
 Effects of IG autonomy on policy should be inverse to political actor pfwer because 21 
the greater(the focal agency's autonomy, the higher the barrier of access for external 22 
actors (Feiock and West, 1993; Sharp, 1991). A restated political actor thesis, for 23 
example, predicts that when the focal agency holds high IG autonomy, it will extend its 24 
political reach and regional prominence (Benson, 1975, p. 232; Niskanen, 1971). 25 
 Three IG variables are used as proxies of political actor power. The first, called 26 
revenue autonomy, is the percent of agency revenues generated from user fees or 27 
dedicated sources (e.g., a permanent transit tax). Both sources provide high budgetary 28 
discretion to the agency. The second, called capital autonomy, is the percent of an 29 
agency's capital funding sourced in a like manner and not dependent on annual legislation 30 
or IG negotiation. The third, called IG interaction, operationalizes Niskanen's 31 
"bureaucratic autonomy" (1971). It is the product of two measures: scope (number of IG 32 
actors involved in focal-agency policymaking) and intensity (percent of those having veto 33 
authority over focal-agency policymaking). Data for the first two IG variables are from 34 
FTA Section 15 reports.  The third is from a survey of transit agency officials and 35 
records. 36 
 Three controls were included to represent the urban structure theses.  Using 1990 37 
Census data extracted for transit district populations, they are race ("percent white 38 
persons" in the population), average income (1989 mean household income), and cross 39 
commuting (percent of workers commuting between a residence and a work place neither 40 
of which is located in the urban core). Cross commuting reflects variance from a center-41 
peripheral pattern of urban activities. 42 
 Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables. The UMC 43 
factor is significantly intercorrelated with average income and marginally associated with 44 
cross commuting (collinearity diagnostics for the models show a condition index of 39).  45 
The UMC's association with average income is probably due to the high income 46 
component of the UMC factor. The UMC's association with cross commuting is probably 1 
due to most UMC living in suburbs, greater proportions of which are found in 2 
nonparametric urban areas (Cervero, 1991). Except for average income and cross 3 
commuting which are associated (r = .57), none of the other controls are intercorrelated at 4 
the .01 level. Collinearity is examined further in the discussion section. 5 
____________________________ 6 
 7 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 8 
____________________________ 9 
 10 
Results 11 
 12 
 Table 3 reports results of OLS regressions for the three UMC hypotheses. Each 13 
model, identified as Outcome I, II and III, includes the UMC factor and seven control 14 
variables. Regression statistics support Hypothesis 1 which argues a UMC genre 15 
encourages emphasis on strategic organizational effectiveness. The UMC factor is the 16 
most significant variable in the model (signif t = .005), and is in the predicted direction 17 
(beta = .81, t = 3.0). IG revenue autonomy is also significant (signif t = .02), but three 18 
others are, at best, only near significance -- party dominance, intergovernmental 19 
interaction and average income (signif t = .17, .13 and .11, respectively).   20 
___________________________ 21 
 22 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 23 
___________________________ 24 
  25 
Regression statistics do not support Hypothesis 2, regarding deemphasis in operations 26 
efficiency (Outcome II). The UMC factor is unstable (signif t = .43), but could be 27 
interpreted as UMC indifference to efficiency. Full-model significance is due instead to 28 
IG fiscal variables: revenue autonomy (beta = .62, t = 4.0, signif = .0003) and capital 29 
autonomy (beta = -.29, t = -1.9, signif t = .07). 30 
 Regression statistics provide strong support for Hypothesis 3, dealing with 31 
emphasis on social program effectiveness. The UMC factor is significant  (signif of t = 32 
.02) and is in the direction predicted by the hypothesis (beta = .64, t = 2.4).  Most controls 33 
are significant or near significance as well. Race (% white) is equally significant to the 34 
UMC factor (Signif of t = .02) and consistent with the underclass thesis. Capital 35 
autonomy is significant (beta = .30, t = 2.0, signif t = .05), but contradicts the political 36 
actor thesis. Average income is near significance (signif t = .08) but contradicts the 37 
wealth thesis. Revenue autonomy and cross commuting are not significant for social 38 
programs (signif t = .16 and .21, respectively). 39 
 40 
Discussion 41 
 42 
 Along side its better known rivals, the UMC thesis appears to matter a great deal 43 
and in accordance with the literature. Especially when compared with political power 44 
variables, the UMC factor is more significant in explaining variance in two out of the 45 
three policy outcomes composing the skewed pattern. Only for Outcome II (operations 46 
efficiency) is direct use of political power more significant. Although the research did not 1 
include a great number of variables subsumed under urban structure, of those considered, 2 
the influence of race in de-emphasizing Outcome III (social program effectiveness) and 3 
average income in de-emphasizing Outcomes I and III are the only ones of comparable 4 
significance to the UMC factor.  5 
 Although the evidence seems to support the importance of an independent UMC 6 
thesis, this conclusion might not be shared by advocates of more traditional arguments. 7 
Since the UMC factor seems to be intercorrelated with some control variables (i.e., 8 
average income, and cross commuting), a question remains about whether the rival theses 9 
have indirectly accounted for the influence of the UMC genre. For this to be true, two 10 
conditions must exist. First, a control variable with which the UMC is statistically 11 
associated must significantly affect a policy outcome. Second, that control must operate 12 
as a route of UMC influence on the outcome.  13 
 Applying the first condition, the UMC factor is intercorrelated only with household 14 
income (r = .85) and cross commuting (r = .40). Of these two, neither is significant as a 15 
determinant of policy outcomes, although income is near significance for social-program 16 
effectiveness. Ordinarily, one could leave the discussion with these results if it were not 17 
for the possible effects of model collinearity caused by the intercorrelation of the UMC 18 
factor and income. Given this, the wealth thesis would argue that the UMC is accounted 19 
for in the simpler proposition that local personal income generates tax receipts for public 20 
expenditures. Since UMC influence is accounted for by its association with income, the 21 
desire for parsimony would side with the wealth thesis because offers the more direct 22 
explanation of policymakers counting tax revenues? 23 
 However, the results cast doubt on average income as a route of determination for 24 
the UMC for two reasons. First, even though the UMC factor has a strong bivariate 25 
association with Outcome I (r = .42) and Outcome III (r = .46), average income has no 26 
association with any of the performance outcomes at the .01 level. Second, in regression 27 
models, average income is only very marginally significant in Outcomes I and III (signif t 28 
= .11 and .08, respectively), but has a negative influence, opposite that of the wealth 29 
thesis and the UMC factor.   30 
 The inclination, then, is to see income’s significance as a fluke of collinearity. To 31 
examine this issue, regressions for Outcomes I and III were rerun, first without average 32 
income and then with income but without the UMC factor. When income is removed, the 33 
UMC factor diminishes only slightly in significance for Outcome I from .005 in the 34 
original model (see Table 2) to .009.  In Outcome III, the decline in significance is 35 
greater (signif t moves from .02 in the original model to .13). On the other hand, when 36 
the UMC factor is removed, average income (which was near significance in the original 37 
Outcome I and III models) becomes insignificant (signif. t = .29 and .92, respectively). 38 
This leads one to suspect the UMC factor is important in explaining variance in policy 39 
outcomes (especially for organizational effectiveness) with or without average income, 40 
but average income is not essential when the model contains the UMC factor. Moreover, 41 
as a weaker variable orbiting the UMC’s influence, income’s negative influence on 42 
Outcomes I and III can be explained as an artifact of collinearity. 43 
 These results therefore leave advocates of urban structure theses hard pressed for 44 
arguing against the UMC factor’s independent significance. Statistics aside, though, one 45 
might still expect proponents of the political actor thesis to argue UMC influence is 46 
reflected in political research because its effect on policy outcomes must be associated 1 
with individuals making direct use of political power. But, does the UMC genre act 2 
through individuals to affect outcomes, or does it indirectly influence as an impersonal 3 
anonymous agent? Could there a connection between the two?   4 
 A case could be made for a connection between the UMC and political 5 
entrepreneurs, and could be understood in one of two ways. In the instance of direct 6 
visible action, we know UMC individuals engage in political activity more than others 7 
and that UMC participation is principally limited to making political contributions and 8 
contacting government officials (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). This would 9 
suggest the impact of elected officials on policy outcomes is mostly a UMC phenomenon 10 
of direct and visible proportions. 11 
 The second interpretation accepts the causal route as an indirect manifestation of 12 
UMC presence but also requires involvement of direct political activity.  Stone (1980) 13 
implies that the UMC influences a city's politics and cultural image by its systemic 14 
power. Pagano and Bowman (1995) add that elected leaders crystallize a vision for world 15 
class status which "is tied to the city's image" (p. xiv). Hence, combining these 16 
interpretations, elected political entrepreneurs would adopt a vision consistent with the 17 
UMC, at least where one-party dominance provides an unobstructed opportunity for 18 
"credit claiming" (Feiock and Clinger mayer, 1986). This argument does not hold up well 19 
under the results, however. A strong correlation does not exist between the UMC and 20 
party dominance (r = .32) and the latter is not near significance for any policy outcome. 21 
 Another connection could involve interest groups and concurring governmental 22 
actors. This study did not consider interest group variables as UMC proxies because they 23 
are distinguished by their issue-specific nature (e.g., environmentalism, handicap access, 24 
abortion rights), and few could be characterized as representing the UMC qua monolithic 25 
UMC (as does the UMC factor). Nevertheless, assuming that a UMC could exist as a 26 
distinct, forceful and single interest group or entrepreneurial voice, two conditions 27 
probably would have to prevail.   28 
 First, to operationalize a set of monolithic UMC interests, its membership would 29 
want to act on its professional organizational norms by seeking influence through an 30 
institutional intergovernmental process. In a few key instances, the process might only 31 
involve direct relations with the focal agency. But, to effectively manage its influence 32 
across a wide urban policy landscape, the UMC would want to capture a few agencies 33 
with broad intergovernmental authority, such as the EPA, rather than numerous 34 
specialized operators. Second, for these UMC "sentry" agencies to be powerful 35 
intergovernmental actors in focal-agency policymaking, the transit agency would have to 36 
possess limited autonomy.   37 
 On this scenario, analysis of the IG autonomy variables shows two results. First, in 38 
a principal components analysis, the UMC factor is orthogonal to all IG variables thus 39 
indicating no causal route. Second, while the UMC factor is very significant in 40 
regressions, it does not show corresponding influence through the IG surrogates for 41 
political-actor power (i.e., the IG variables are either less significant than the UMC factor 42 
or have an effect opposite the UMC's influence). Hence, even though UMC individuals 43 
certainly operate through interest groups and politicians for specific interests, Stone 44 
seems to be correct: the influence of an UMC genre is "completely impersonal," and 45 
manifested as "systemic power [which] is not a general form of upper strata dominance 1 
through agenda control" (1980, p.989).  2 
 3 
Inferences 4 
 5 
 Even if all rival theses are refuted, one issue remains. Although the results indicate 6 
an anonymous UMC matters in skewing outcomes, they do not map how one could more 7 
precisely infer the power of the upper middle class. As an old issue in urban research, 8 
class power yields no easy or definitive answers. Nevertheless, pointing to 9 
socioeconomic stratification, Stone (1980) sees an indirect and anonymous route 10 
involving the UMC's systemic power: "Because the [UMC] are strategically advantaged, 11 
their extraordinary influence is not so much exercised as it is selectively manifested in the 12 
predispositions and behavior of public officials" (p. 990). But, if influence is the central 13 
feature of the UMC ambiance, how does the cuing process happen based on non-verbal 14 
exchange?   15 
 One plausible extension to Stone's sketch is a process involving the social 16 
construction of UMC by policymakers. The theory "refers to the cultural 17 
characterizations or popular images of persons or groups" (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, 18 
p. 334), and stems from cognitive psychology (e.g., Tajfel and Turner, 1986). With 19 
Stone's descriptions of political influence (1980, p. 980), social construction points to 20 
policymakers designing agency outcomes to "fit" what they "anticipate" stereotype 21 
"target populations" want (Schneider and Ingram, 1993).   22 
 To Berger and Luckmann, however, two kinds of social constructs result in policy 23 
deliberations -- images derived from the "face-to-face situation" with political actors, and 24 
ones from "remoter forms of interaction" where cognition of individuals or organized 25 
groups is not apparent (1966, p. 30). In this latter instance, they say cognition is of 26 
"anonymous" characterizations of a "category" (i.e., the UMC genre) rather than of 27 
individually-known actors with which the agency interacts. "[A]nonymity may become 28 
near-total with certain typifications that are not intended ever to become individualized" 29 
(p. 33).   30 
 What remains dim is how the UMC as an impersonal abstract is reified to the point 31 
it matters in policymaking. Part of the answer may lie in Stone's belief that policymakers 32 
favor UMC interests over others because this genre is perceived to hold a disproportional 33 
share of society’s "diamond-shaped distribution of opportunities and resources" (p.982). 34 
"Though they are the least numerous segment of the population, members of the upper 35 
strata possess resources strategically important to public officials [in furthering careers 36 
and agency growth]" (p. 984).   37 
 Stone contends, then, the UMC's influence on policymaking "flows more from the 38 
position they occupy than from the covert action they take" (p. 984). Just perceiving 39 
UMC presence and social position may be sufficient to create the unspoken influence of 40 
referent power. In concert, Berger and Luckmann conclude "Power in society includes 41 
the power to determine decisive socialization processes and, therefore, the power to 42 
produce reality" (1966, p. 119).   43 
 This raises a final point about the impact on policymaker perceptions.  The 44 
powerful results for the UMC suggest it is a widely recognized genre, perhaps 45 
representing a predictable set of determinant public expectations. As a constant in a 46 
metropolitan milieu otherwise seen as a chaotic state, this class genre may provide a 1 
stabilizing influence on those urban governments where UMC are a significant 2 
proportion of the metropolitan population. The genre offers a reliable context for 3 
policymaking, reducing uncertainty about political consequences for public officials 4 
having to make difficult policy choices. 5 
 If this stabilizing phenomenon exists, further research needs to delve into the social 6 
psychological origins of a UMC genre within the agency. Do bureaucratic structures and 7 
processes pose barriers to direct representation and foster more reliance on anonymous 8 
identities as political considerations?  Is the "general public interest" derived from the 9 
UMC's systemic power or from the median voter? Is this reinforced by bureaucrats who 10 
are mostly UMC and aspiring to fulfill their own interests? Since living the UMC 11 
lifestyle gives policymakers knowledge about nuances, Lieberman believes the causal 12 
route more appropriately involves "political construction [which] asks not only how 13 
group identities arise in a political setting but also how and why they become politically 14 
relevant..." (1995, p. 440). In short, pursuing this line of inquiry reopens issues about the 15 
role of class structure and bureaucratic decision making. 16 
 17 
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Table 1 1 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES OF PERFORMANCE SKEWNESS 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations 3 
 4 
          ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 
          VARIABLE            MEAN        S. D.         1           2          3    6 
          ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
          1. Outcome I            10.99          2.27          - 8 
 9 
          2. Outcome II           13.01         2.74        -.56**     - 10 
 11 
          3. Outcome III          12.29         2.53         .48*     -.38*       - 12 
          ____________________________________________________________ 13 
 14 
              N = 42   TWO-TAILED SIGNIFICANCE:  * = .01   ** = .001 15 
 16 
               OUTCOME I   = Strategic Organizational Effectiveness 17 
               OUTCOME II  = Operations Efficiency 18 
               OUTCOME III = Social Program Effectiveness 19 
          ____________________________________________________________ 20 
 21 
NOTE TO TABLE:  Each outcome is an index of individual measures which meet criteria for that outcome 22 
"cell."  Values for each measure are residuals of a bivariate regression controlling for size.  The technique 23 
was used because (1) little disagreement is found over size as the most significant factor determining urban 24 
agency outcomes, and (2) regression residuals are more appropriate than ratio data since regression 25 
produces the best overall linear estimator of variance.  Residuals for each measure within an outcome cell 26 
were then studentized to make them additive to an outcome index. 27 
 28 
     The indexes consist of the following measures along with their legitimating stakeholders: 29 
 30 
Outcome I (administration-centered, strategic effectiveness) - market penetration (passenger trips/district 31 
population) shows domain dominance preferred by senior management; load factor (passenger 32 
miles/vehicle miles) shows user-validated service superiority preferred by senior management; and 33 
institutional growth (1990 revenue/1980 revenue, all sources) shows negative entropy preferred by senior 34 
management. 35 
 36 
Outcome II (administration-centered, operational efficiency) - operations efficiency (operating 37 
expense/vehicle miles) shows cost control proficiency of production management; maintenance efficiency 38 
(maintenance expense/vehicle hours) shows cost control proficiency of maintenance management; and 39 
system efficiency (operations assets/vehicle revenue miles) shows use of capital proficiency of financial 40 
and engineering managements. 41 
 42 
Outcome III (political-centered, social program effectiveness) - mobility for transit dependent (passenger 43 
miles/service area in square miles) measures access convenience to urban economic activities desired by 44 
dependent commuters (handicapped, working poor); non-commute service (off-peak vehicle miles/total 45 
vehicle miles) measures access convenience to social activities and welfare services needed by non-46 
working handicapped, poor and elderly; and economic development contribution (annual capital 47 
investment/district population) measures economic development impact potential for the regional 48 
population. 49 
Table 2 1 
UMC GENRE AND CONTROL VARIABLES 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations 3 
 4 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 
VARIABLE  MEAN        S.D.    1         2            3            4          5           6           7  6 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
1. UMC FACTOR    0.00        1.00 8 
 9 
POLITICAL ACTOR 10 
 11 
2. Party Dominance    2.02          .78  .32 - 12 
 13 
3.    Revenue Autonomy   76.72      22.38  .14 .06 - 14 
 15 
4.    Capital Autonomy    26.70      18.43  .37 .11 .37 - 16 
 17 
5.    IG Interaction         5.37        3.62  .32 .04        -.02       -.03 - 18 
 19 
URBAN STRUCTURE 20 
 21 
6.    Race (% white)   68.57      15.00              -.03 .05        -.06         .03        -.20 - 22 
 23 
7.    1989 Avg. Income   33.70        6.56  .85** .28 .24         .36         .25          .01       - 24 
 25 
8.    Cross Commuting   44.25      17.17  .40* .15 .34         .23         .06         .13    .57** 26 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 27 
 28 
   N = 42   TWO-TAILED SIGNIFICANCE: * = .01   ** = .001 29 
Table 3 1 
OLS REGRESSIONS: UPPER MIDDLE CLASS GENRE AND PERFORMANCE SKEWNESS 2 
Urban Public Transit (42 Agencies, 1987-1991) 3 
 4 
 5 
      D E P E N D E N T   V A R I A B L E S 6 
 7 
      OUTCOME I            OUTCOME II            OUTCOME III     8 
INDEPENDENT   9 
VARIABLES                beta      t    signif      beta      t    signif         beta      t    signif 10 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 11 
 12 
1. UMC FACTOR   .81     3.0   .005      -.22   -0.8     .43           .64     2.4      .02 13 
 14 
POLITICAL ACTOR 15 
 16 
2.Party Dominance               -.19    -1.4   .17       .06    0.4     .67           .13     1.0      .35 17 
 18 
3. IG Revenue Autonomy              -.35    -2.4    .02       .62    4.0   .0003        -.21    -1.5     .16 19 
 20 
4. IG Capital Autonomy   .09     0.6    .54      -.29   -1.9    .07            .30     2.0     .05 21 
 22 
5. IG Interaction   .22     1.6    .13          -.01   -0.1    .94            .11     0.8     .45 23 
 24 
URBAN STRUCTURE: 25 
 26 
6. Race (% White)   .03     0.2      .83        -.02    -0.2    .87          -.34    -2.5     .02 27 
 28 
7. Avg. Income (1989)               -.46    -1.6     .11         -.03    -0.1    .93          -.51    -1.8     .08 29 
 30 
8. Cross Commuting   .02     0.1     .90         -.12    -0.7    .50           .21      1.3     .21 31 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 32 
 33 
 R2     .46         .41   .46 34 
 35 
 ADJ R2     .33         .26   .33 36 
 37 
 F     3.5        2.8   3.6 38 
 39 
 SIGNIF F    .005        .02   .004  40 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 41 
 42 
 OUTCOME I   = Strategic Organizational Effectiveness 43 
 44 
 OUTCOME II  = Operations Efficiency 45 
 46 
 OUTCOME III = Social Program Effectiveness 47 
 48 
 49 
